" . . . [A]nybody who by his nature is not
his own man, but another's, is by his nature a slave;
anybody who, being a man, is an article of property is
another's man; an article of property is an instrument
intended for the purpose of action and separable from its
[See Edward Ayoub's Quantum Theory
trade of the petty usurer is hated with most reason: it makes a profit from currency
itself, instead of making it from the process which currency was meant to serve"1b
for buying and selling should be separate from
[the] public square and at a
distance from it . . . "1c
" . . . [T]hose who follow
illiberal occupations, like . . . moneylenders who make
small loans at a high rate of interest; for all these receive
more than is right, and not from the right source. Their common
characteristic is obviously their sordid avarice . . . "2a
" . .
. [J]ust means lawful and fair; and unjust means both unlawful
" . .
. [V]irtue ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim, and
prudence that of the means towards it."2c
. . . [P]hilosophy is rightly called a knowledge of Truth. . . But
we cannot know the truth apart from the cause."3a
. . . [I]t is of Being qua Being that we . . . must
grasp the first causes."3b*
. . . [H]owever much things may be 'so and not so,' yet differences
of degree are inherent in the nature of things. For we
should not say that 2 and 3 are equally even; nor are he who thinks
that 4 is 5, and he who thinks it is 1000, equally wrong: hence if
they are not equally wrong, the one is clearly less wrong, and so
"To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is
false; but to say that what is is, and
what is not is not, is true; and therefore also
he who says that a thing is or is not will
say either what is true and what is false."3d
. . . [I]f every intellectual activity is either practical or
productive or speculative, physics will be a speculative science
. . . it is clear . . . why it is the province of the physicist
to study even some aspects of the soul, so far as it is not
independent of matter."3e
term 'being' . . . denotes first the 'what' of a thing . . . what
it is . . . "3f*
. . . [D]estruction is an evil."3g
" . . . [T]he point of our
investigation is to acquire knowledge, and a prerequisite for
knowing anything is understanding why it is as it is -
in other words, grasping its primary cause."4a
. . . [W]henever there is an end, the whole prior sequence of
actions is performed with this end as its purpose."4b
" . . . [W]e may with good reason
claim a high place for the inquiry concerning the soul. . . the
soul being virtually the principle of all animal
"Matter is identical with
potentiality, form with actuality."5b
" . . . [B]y life we
mean the power of self-nourishment and of independent
growth and decay."5c
"The soul . . . is the actuality
of the body . . ."5d
" . . . [I]f the
eye were an animal, eyesight would be its soul, this being the
substance as notion or form of the eye."5e
" . . . [W]here there is
sensation, there is also pleasure and pain:
and, where these are, desire also must of necessity be
present. But as regards intellect and the speculative
faculty the case is not yet clear. It would seem, however, to be
a distinct species of soul, and it alone is capable of
separation from the body, as that which is eternal from
that which is perishable."5f
. . . the sense of touch is the
most exact of man's senses. In the other senses man is inferior
to many of the animals, but in delicacy of touch he is
far superior to the rest. And to this he owes his superior
" . . . [I]ntellect is
capable of thinking itself."5h
" . . . [T]hat which acts
is always superior to that which is acted upon, the cause or
principle to the matter. Now actual
knowledge is identical with the thing known, but
potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual; and yet
not universally prior in time. But this intellect has
no intermittence in its thought. It is, however, only when
separated that it is its true self, and this, its essential
nature, alone is immortal and eternal."5i
" . . . as the hand is the instrument of instruments, so
the intellect is the form of forms and sensation the form
of sensibles. But, since, apart from sensible magnitudes
there is nothing, as it would seem, independently existent, it
is in the sensible forms that the intelligible forms exist
. . ."5j
. . . action is determined by
desire . . ."5k
"By intelligence we mean that
which calculates the means to an end, that is, the
practical intellect, which differs from the
speculative intellect by the end at which it aims."5l
" . . . [T]ouch is the
one sense that the animal cannot do without. The other senses
which it possesses are . . . the means, not to its being, but to
Italics in the original.
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.).
Translated by Ernest Barker, revised with an
Introduction and Notes by R.F. Stalley. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995.
At 14 (1254a13).
At 29-30 (1258a35).
At 278-279 (1331a19).
The Ethics of
Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated
by J.A.K. Thomson, 1953. Revised with Notes and Appendices by Hugh
Tredennick, 1976. Introduction and Bibliography by Jonathan Barnes,
1976. London, England: Penguin Books Ltd.
a Book IV: Other Moral Virtues, at 148.
b Book V: Justice, at 172.
c Book VI: Intellectual Virtues, at 222.
Books I-IX. Translation by Hugh Tredennick. G.P. Goold, ed.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933, 1989. (The Loeb
Book II, at 87.
Book IV, at 147.
Book IV, at 181.
Book IV, at 201.
Book VI, at 295.
Book VII, at 311.
Book IX, at 467.
Translated by Robin Waterfield, 1996. With an Introduction and Notes
by David Bostock, 1996. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Book II: The Study of Nature, at 38-39.
Book II: The Study of Nature, at 51.
Translated by R. D.
Hicks. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991.
a At 9.
b At 37.
c Ibid., at 37.
d At 38.
e At 39.
f At 41-42.
g At 61.
h At 86.
i At 88.
j At 93.
k At 95.
l At 96.
m At 103.