The World Is
Art of Life
Whole of Virtue
. . . [P]hilosophy is rightly called a knowledge of Truth. . . But
we cannot know the truth apart from the cause."1a
. . . [I]t is of Being qua Being that we . . . must
grasp the first causes."1b*
. . . [I]f every intellectual activity is either practical or
productive or speculative, physics will be a speculative science
. . . it is clear . . . why it is the province of the physicist
to study even some aspects of the soul, so far as it is not
independent of matter."1c
term 'being' . . . denotes first the 'what' of a thing . . . what
it is . . . "1d*
" . . . [T]he point of our
investigation is to acquire knowledge, and a prerequisite for
knowing anything is understanding why it is as it is -
in other words, grasping its primary cause."2a
. . . [W]henever there is an end, the whole prior sequence of
actions is performed with this end as its purpose."2b
"Experience concludeth nothing universally. . . But by this
it is plain, that they shall conjecture best, that have most
experience . . . "1a
"Everything I have accepted up to now as being absolutely
true and assured, I have learned from or through the senses. But I
have sometimes found that these senses played me false, and it
is prudent never to trust entirely those who have once deceived
"Even fewer people study man than mathematics."1a
Discourse on Metaphysics.
" . . .
which is to happen to anyone is already virtually
included in his nature or concept, as all the
properties are contained in the definition of a circle .
. . "1a
" . . .
soul has the power of representing to itself any form or nature
whenever the occasion comes for thinking about it, and I think
that this activity of our soul is, so far as it expresses some
nature, form or essence, properly the idea of the
" . . .
already includes the
idea which is comprised in any
" . . . [T]he
individual concept of each person includes once for all everything
which can ever happen to him . . . "1d
"In order to call
anything possible it is enough that we are able to form a notion
of it . . . "1e
" . . . [N]othing
happens without a reason . . . "1f
"A body is an
aggregation of substances . . .
Each of these substances contains in its nature the law
of the continuous progression of its own workings
and all that has happened to it and all that
will happen to it."1g
"Our reasoning is
based upon two great principles: first, that of Contradiction
. . . And second, the principle of Sufficient Reason . . .
There are also two kinds of Truths: those of Reasoning
and those of Fact. The Truths of Reasoning are necessary,
and their opposite is impossible. Those of Fact, however, are contingent,
and their opposite is possible."1h
"Today . . . when it
has been learned through careful investigations made in
plant, insect, and animal life, that the organic bodies
of nature are never the product of chaos or
putrefaction, but always come from seeds in
which there was without doubt some preformation,
it has been decided that not only is the organic body
already present before conception, but also that a soul,
in a word, the animal itself, is also in this body . . .
Critique of Pure
" . . . [T]hough
all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows
that all arises out of experience."1a
" . . . [B]esides intuition
there is no other mode of knowledge, except through concepts
. . . "1b
"The possibility of
experience is, then, that which gives objective reality
to all our a priori knowledge."1c
" . . . [I]t is only because we
subject the sequence of appearances, and consequently all change, to
the law of causality, that experience itself, that is,
empirical knowledge of appearances, becomes possible . . . "1d
and Other Essays.
"The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first
principles of a science, are really the last results of
metaphysical analysis . . . and their relation to the science
is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a
tree . . . "1a
Origin of Species.
. . . [C]an we doubt . . . that individuals having any
advantage, however slight, over others, would have the
better chance of surviving and of procreating their kind? . . .
This preservation of favourable individual differences and
variations, and the destruction of those which are
injurious, I have called Natural Selection, or
the Survival of the Fittest."1a
selects only for his own good . . . "1b
The Descent of
race or body of men has been so completely subjugated
by other men, as that certain individuals should be preserved, and
thus unconsciously selected, from somehow excelling
in utility to their masters."2a
facts are highly injurious to the progress of science, for they
often endure long . . . "2b
of Psychology (Volume 1).
"The aim of
science is always to reduce complexity to simplicity .
about a thing is knowledge of its relations.
In all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or
subject about which all the members of the thought revolve.
Relation, then, to our topic of interest is
constantly felt in the fringe, and particularly the relation of
harmony and discord, of furtherance or hindrance of the
what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind,
in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.
Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence.
It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal
effectively with others . . ."1c
are commonly believed to excel other men in their power of
"A native talent
for perceiving analogies is reckoned. . . as the
leading fact in genius of every order. . . I think I emphasize it
enough when I call it one of the ultimate foundation-pillars of
the intellectual life, the others being Discrimination,
Retentiveness, and Association."1e*
of Psychology (Volume 2)
widest postulate of rationality is that the world is
rationally intelligible throughout . . ."2a
The Life of Reason.
IV REASON IN
"The great glory of mathematics,
like that of virtue, is to be useful while remaining
"Is four really twice two? The
answer is not that most people say so, but that, in saying so,
I am not misunderstanding myself."2g
"Men know better what is right and
wrong than what is ultimately good or evil . .
"There is tragedy in perfection,
because the universe in which perfection arises is itself
"True science, then, was that
which enabled a man to disentangle and attain his natural
good; and such a science is also the art of
life and the whole of virtue."2j
". . . [S]cience
is nothing but developed perception, interpreted intent,
commonsense rounded out and minutely articulated."2k
"The darkest spots are in man himself,
in his fitful, irrational disposition."2l
The Philosophy of
. . . [T]he scientific value of a formula consists not only in its
summing up of given empirical facts but in its power . . . to call
forth new facts. The formula states relationships,
connections, series which far outdistance direct observation.
It becomes one of the most outstanding instruments of what Leibniz
called the 'logic of discovery,' the logica inventionis."1a
"The true standard for the
evaluation of a physical hypothesis . . . can never be sought in
its intuitive reference but only in its efficacy. It is not the
simplicity of the image that is decisive, but the unity of
the explanation, the subsumption of the totality of natural
phenomena under supreme comprehensive rules."1b
"The ideals which have
lighted my way, and time after time have given me new courage to
face life cheerfully, have been Kindness, Beauty, and Truth.
. . "1a
" . . . [T]he scientific
method can teach us nothing else beyond how facts are related
to, and conditioned by, each other."1b
" . . . [S]cience
can only ascertain what is, but not what should
be . . . Religion . . . deals only with evaluations
of human thought and action . . . [S]cience
can only be created by those who are thoroughly imbued with the
aspirations toward truth and understanding. This
source of feeling, however, springs from the sphere of religion.
To this there also belongs the faith in the possibility that the
regulations valid for the world of existence are rational, that
is, comprehensible to reason. I cannot conceive of a
genuine scientist without that profound faith. The situation may
be expressed by an image: science without religion is lame,
religion without science is blind."1c*
The Principle of
"If this is the way it's
going to be, may we give up what is worthy of thought in
favor of the recklessness of exclusively calculative thinking
and its immense achievements? Or are we obliged to find paths upon
which thinking is capable of responding to what is worthy of
thought instead of, enchanted by calculative thinking, mindlessly
passing over what is worthy of thought?"1
Concepts of Metaphysics.
". . . [A]lthough it objectively
comprises a great wealth, mathematical knowledge is in itself,
in terms of its content, the emptiest knowledge imaginable,
and as such is at the same time the least binding for man. . ."5a
"Philosophy does not exist because
there are sciences, but vice-versa: there can be sciences
only because and only if there is philosophy."5b*
". . . [T]here must be no such
circling and thus no circle in philosophy! This is, after
all, a universal principle of logic. That is why all
scientific philosophy prides itself on getting by without this
circle. Yet anyone who has never been seized by dizziness in
the presence of a philosophical question has never asked the
question in a philosophical way, that is, has never entered
the circle in the first place. The only thing that ordinary
understanding can see in this circling motion is the
movement around the periphery which always returns to its
original point of departure on the periphery. Thus it misses
the decisive issue here, which is an insight into the centre of
the circle as such, an insight made possible in such a
circling movement and this alone."5c
Out of the
is the world's most underdeveloped nation? With the storehouse
of skills and knowledge contained in its millions of unemployed,
and with the even more appalling underuse, misuse, and abuse
of skills and knowledge in the army of employed people in all
ranks in all industries, the United States may be today the
most underdeveloped nation in the world."1a
"Experience alone, without
theory, teaches management nothing about what to do to improve
quality and competitive position, nor how to do it. . . Experience
will answer a question, and a question comes from theory."1b
psychology, statistical theory, theory of law, yes, but most
studies of accounting, marketing, and finance are skills, not
education; most use of computers for paperwork likewise."1c
"How could we arrest scientific and industrial progress?
By closing down, or by controlling, laboratories for research, by
suppressing or controlling scientific periodicals . . ., by
suppressing Universities . . . , by suppressing books, the
printing press, writing, and, in the end, speaking."1a
Computer and the Brain.
. . . [T]he
nervous system has a prima facie digital
nervous system occupies a space of the order magnitude of a
(in the brain), i.e. of 103 cm.3 The
number of neurons contained in this system is usually
estimated to be of the order of
1010 . . . "1b
dissipation in the human central nervous system (in the
brain) is of the order of 10 watts."1c
" . .
. [T]he message-system used in the nervous system .
. . is of an essentially statistical character."1d*
languages are traditionally transmitted to us in various
forms, but their very multiplicity proves that there is nothing
absolute and necessary about them. . . [I]t is only reasonable to
assume that logics and mathematics are similarly historical,
accidental forms of expression."1e
Management and Society.
has moved, from having been an ornament, if not a luxury, to
the central economic resource of technological society."1a
"In government, modern technology and
the modern economy founded on it have outmoded the national
state as a viable unit."1b
"Aware that we are living in the midst
of a technological revolution, we are becoming increasingly
concerned with its meaning for the individual and its impact on
freedom, on society, and on our political institutions.
Side by side with messianic promises of utopia to be ushered in by
technology, there are the most dire warnings of man's enslavement
by technology, his alienation from himself and from
society, and the destruction of all human and political
"The kindergarten stage is over. We're
past the time when everybody was terribly impressed by the
computer's ability to do two plus two in fractions of a
Wholeness and the Implicate Order.
"The new form of insight can
perhaps best be called Undivided Wholeness in Flowing
Movement. . . In this flow, mind and matter are not separate
substances. Rather, they are different aspects of one whole
"There is the germ of a new
notion of order . . . This order is not to be understood
solely in terms of a regular arrangement of objects . . .
or . . . of events . . . Rather, a total order
is contained, in some implicit sense, in each region of
space and time."1b*
"For several centuries,
there has been a strong feeling that nonlocal theories are not
acceptable in physics. It is well known . . . that Newton felt
very uneasy about action-at-a-distance and that Einstein
regarded it as 'spooky.'"2a
"The basic idea is to
introduce a new concept of order, which we call the implicate
order or the enfolded order."2b
"Consider a tree . . . which
grows from a seed. . . [L]ife is eternally
enfolded in matter and more deeply in the underlying
ground of a generalized holomovement as is mind and
" . . . [W]hile American industry was spending about $76
billion each year on research and development as of 1992, the
National Association of Manufacturers estimated that this same
industrial sector was spending $118 billion on outside
legal services. . . If we continue to pay roughly one and
one-half times as much on litigation as we do on the creation of
new wealth in American industry -- in other words, research and
development -- we are on a trajectory to economic disaster."1*
Science and Technology Yearbook 1999.
" . . . [I]n my own area of physics and the physical
sciences, we have the arrogance to believe that with the
tools of mathematics and fewer than 20 natural
laws, we can aspire to eventually understand the entire
natural universe and its evolution. I have no idea how
many laws the average lawyer deals with on a regular basis,
but most certainly that number is vastly greater than 20."2
The Double Helix:
A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA.
. . [S]cience seldom proceeds
in the straightforward logical manner imagined by outsiders. . .
But even more important, I believe,
remains general ignorance about how science is "done.""1a
. . .
[W]e knew what to do:
Linus Pauling and beat him at his own game."1b
"All we had to do was to
construct a set of molecular models and begin to play
-- with luck, the structure would be a helix."1c
. . .
[O]ur reasoning was partially based upon
. . . he [Francis
Crick] popped out with the idea that the perfect
biological principle was the self-replication of the gene
-- that is, the ability of the gene to be exactly copied when the
chromosome number doubles during cell division."1e
"The idea of the
genes' being immortal smelled right . . ."1f
"Even though he [Francis]
was a physicist, he knew that
important biological objects come
"If this was DNA,
I should create a bombshell by announcing its discovery. The
existence of two intertwined chains with identical
base sequences could not be a chance matter. Instead
it would strongly suggest that one chain in each molecule had
at some earlier stage served as the template for the
synthesis of the other chain. Under this scheme, gene
replication starts with the separation of its two identical
chains. . . Thus, the essential trick of gene
replication could come from the requirement that
base in the newly synthesized chain always hydrogen-bonds to an
. . .
[W]e had found the
secret of life."1h
of the Mind.
"Understanding is, after all, what
science is all about -- and science is a great deal more than
mere mindless computation."1a
. . . the 'tilting' of light cones, i.e. the distortion of
causality due to gravity, is not only a subtle phenomenon, but
a real phenomenon, and it cannot be explained away
by a residual or 'emergent' property that arises when
conglomerations of matter get large enough."1b*
. . .
[Einstein's general relativity] theory is confirmed
overall to an error of no more than about
of quantum theory were triumphantly vindicated . . ."1d
argument does not argue in favour of there being inaccessible
mathematical truths. What it does argue for, on the other
hand, is that human insight lies beyond formal argument
and beyond computable procedures. Moreover, it argues
powerfully for the very existence of the Platonic mathematical
world. Mathematical truth
is not determined arbitrarily by the rules of some 'man-made' formal system, but has an absolute
nature, and lies beyond any such system of specifiable
Italics in the original.
Books I-IX. Translation by Hugh Tredennick. G.P. Goold, ed.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933, 1989. (The Loeb
Book II, at 87.
Book IV, at 147.
Book VI, at 295.
Book VII, at 311.
Translated by Robin Waterfield, 1996. With an Introduction and Notes
by David Bostock, 1996. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Book II: The Study of Nature, at 38-39.
Book II: The Study of Nature, at 51.
Hobbes. Human Nature and De
Corpore Politico. Edited with an
Introduction by J.C.A. Gaskin, 1994. Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 1994.
Part I: Human Nature. Of the Several Kinds of Discursion of the
Mind, at 33.
Descartes (1596-1650). Discourse on
Method and the Meditations (1637). Translated with an
Introduction by F.E. Sutcliffe. F.E. Sutcliffe, 1968. London, UK:
Penguin Books Ltd.
a First Meditation: About the Things We May Doubt, at
1 Blaise Pascal
(1623-1662). Pensées (1670).
Translated with an Introduction by A.J. Krailsheimer. A.J.
Krailsheimer, 1966, 1995. London, UK: Penguin Books Ltd.
a Human Nature, Style, Jesuits, etc., at 217.
1 G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716).
on Metaphysics. Correspondence with Arnauld. Monadology.
Introduction by Paul Janet. Translated by George Montgomery. Lasalle,
IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1902, 1995.
XIII, at 20.
XXVI, at 44.
on Metaphysics, XXIX, at 48.
Relating to the Metaphysics, I Leibniz to Count Ernst
von Hessen-Rheinfels, 1/11 Feb., 1686, at 69.
IX, at 131.
IX, at 132.
Relating to the Metaphysics,
Leibniz to Arnauld, Venice, March 23, 1690, at
Monadology, at 268.
1 Immanuel Kant.
of Pure Reason
(1781). A revised and expanded translation based on
Meiklejohn. Edited by Vasilis Politis. Introduction and Chronology,
J.M. Dent, 1993. London, UK: J.M. Dent, Orion Publishing Group.
Rutland, VT: Charles E. Turtle Co. Inc.
a The Difference Between Pure and Empirical Knowledge,
b Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure
Concepts of the Understanding, at 78.
c System of the Principles of the Pure Understanding, at
d Principle of the Succession in Time According to the
Law of Causality, at 173.
Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Utilitarianism
Essays. Edited with an Introduction by Alan Ryan. Alan
Ryan, 1987. London, UK: Penguin Books Ltd., 1987.
a Utilitarianism, at 273.
1 Charles Darwin
(1809-1882). The Origin of Species
(1859). In Darwin, Philip
Appleman (ed.), 2nd ed., New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company,
Inc., 1970, 1979.
a Natural Selection;
Or the Survival of the Fittest, at 54.
b Natural Selection; Or the Survival of the Fittest, at
2 Charles Darwin
(1809-1882). The Descent of Man (1871). In Darwin,
Appleman (ed.), 2nd ed., New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company,
Inc., 1970, 1979.
a On the Manner of
Development of Man from Some Lower Form, at 156.
b General Summary and Conclusion, at 196.
William James (1842-1910).
The Principles of Psychology
(Volume 1). Henry Holt & Co., 1890. Alice H. James, 1918. Mineola,
NY: Dover Publications, 1950. (First published by Henry Holt & Co.
Chapter ix: The Stream of Thought, at
c Chapter xi:
xiii: Discrimination and Comparison, at
(1842-1910). The Principles
of Psychology (Volume 2).
Henry Holt & Co., 1890. Alice H. James, 1918. Mineola, NY: Dover
Publications, 1950. (First published by Henry Holt & Co. in 1890.)
Chapter xxviii: Necessary Truths and the
Effects of Experience, at
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998. [Originally published in 5
v.: The Life of Reason, or, The Phases of Human Progress. New
York: C. Scribners' Sons, 1905-6.]
IV REASON IN SCIENCE
Chapter 6: Dialectic, at
Chapter 7: Pre-Rational
Morality, at 444.
Ibid., at 450.
Chapter 8: Rational Ethics,
Ibid., at 458.
Chapter 10: The Validity of
Science, at 484.
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.
3: The Phenomenology of Knowledge. Translated by Ralph Manheim.
Introductory Note by Charles W. Hendel. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1957, 1985.
The Foundations of Scientific
Knowledge, at 440.
The Foundations of Scientific
Knowledge, at 463.
1 Albert Einstein (1879-1955). Ideas
and Opinions. Based on Mein
Weltbild, edited by Carl Seelig, and other sources.
New translations and revisions by Sonja Bargmann. New York, NY: Crown
Publishers, Inc., 1954.
a The World as I See It., at 8-11. Originally
published in Forum and Century, Vol. 84, pp. 193-194, the
13th in the Forum series, "Living Philosophies";
included also in Living Philosophies (pp. 3-7), New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1931.
b Science and Religion, Part I, at 41-44. From an
address at Princeton Theological Seminary, May 19, 1939; published
in Out of My Later Years, New York: Philosophical Library,
c Science and Religion, Part II, at 44-49. From Science,
Philosophy and Religion, A Symposium, published by the
Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation
to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., New York, 1941.
1 Martin Heidegger. The
Principle of Reason. Translated by Reginald Lilly.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, at 129.
Edwards Deming (1900-1993).
Out of the
Edwards Deming, 1982, 1986. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Center for Advanced Engineering Study,
a Ch. 1: Chain Reaction: Quality, Productivity, Lower
Costs, Capture the Market, at 6.
b Ch. 2: Principles for Transformation of Western
Management, at 19.
c Ch. 3: Diseases and Obstacles, at 130.
R. Popper (1902-1994). The Poverty of Historicism.
Karl Raimund Popper, 1957, 1960, 1961. London, UK: Routledge,
a The Institutional Theory of Progress, at 154.
John von Neumann (1903-1957).
Computer and the Brain. (Yale University Silliman
Lectures.) Preface by Klara von Neumann. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1958.
Part 2: The Brain. The Nature of the Nerve Impulse, at
Ibid., at 48.
Ibid., at 49.
Part 2: The Brain. Nature
of the System of Notations Employed, at 79.
Ibid., at 81.
Peter F. Drucker (b. 1909). Technology
Management and Society: Essays. Peter F. Drucker,
1958, 1959, 1961, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970. New York, NY: Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc., 1977.
Ch. 5: Technology and
Society in the Twentieth Century, at 82. Reprinted from Technology
in Western Civilization, vol. II, edited by Melvin Kranzberg and
Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., Regents of the University of Wisconsin,
Ch. 5, at 90.
Ch. 7: The First
Technological Revolution and Its Lessons, at 117. Presidential
address to the Society for the History of Technology, December 29,
1965; First published in Technology and Culture, Spring 1966.
Ch. 10: The Manager and
the Moron, at 173. First published in The McKinsey Quarterly,
1 David Bohm. Wholeness
and the Implicate Order. David Bohm, 1980.
London, UK: Routledge.
a Fragmentation and Wholeness, at 11.
b Quantum Theory as an Indication of a New
Order in Physics. Part B: Implicate and Explicate Order in
Physical Law, at 149.
2 David Bohm and Basil J.
The Undivided Universe: An
Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory.
D. Bohm and B.J. Hiley, 1993. London, UK:
a The Many-Body System, at 57.
b Quantum Theory and the Implicate Order, at 350.
c Quantum Theory and the Implicate Order, at 388.
1 D. Allan Bromley. The
President's Scientists: Reminiscences of a White House Science
Advisor (Yale University Mrs. Hepsa Ely Silliman
Memorial Lectures). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.
Rebuilding the Office of Science and Technology Policy, at 48.
Allan Bromley. AAAS Science
and Technology Policy Yearbook 1999. Washington, DC:
American Association for the Advancement of Science. Chapter 10:
Science and the Law, at http://www.aaas.org/spp/yearbook/chap10.htm.
(Based on remarks made August 2, 1998 during the 1998 Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association in Toronto, Ontario,
The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the
Structure of DNA.
Foreword by Sir Lawrence Bragg. James
D. Watson, 1968.
York, NY: The New American Library, Inc., 1969. (Reprint of a
hardcover edition published by Atheneum
Publishers, New York, NY.)
Penrose. Shadows of the Mind: A Search
for the Missing Science of Consciousness. Roger
Penrose, 1994. London, UK: Vintage, Random House UK Limited, 1995.
First published by Oxford University Press, 1994.
a Preface, at vii.
b What New Physics We Need to Understand the Mind: The
Quest for a Non-computational Physics of Mind, at 225.
c What New Physics We Need to Understand the Mind, at 230.
d The reference here is to the 1981 Paris experiment
by Alain Aspect et al. What New Physics We Need to Understand the
Mind, at 248.
e What New Physics We Need to Understand the Mind:
Implications?, at 418.