Intellectual Life
The World Is

Natural Good
Art of Life
Whole of Virtue
The Metaphysics.

" . . . [P]hilosophy is rightly called a knowledge of Truth. . . But we cannot know the truth apart from the cause."1a

" . . . [I]t is of Being qua Being that we . . . must grasp the first causes."1b*

" . . . [I]f every intellectual activity is either practical or productive or speculative, physics will be a speculative science . . . it is clear . . . why it is the province of the physicist to study even some aspects of the soul, so far as it is not independent of matter."1c

"The term 'being' . . . denotes first the 'what' of a thing . . . what it is . . . "1d*


" . . . [T]he point of our investigation is to acquire knowledge, and a prerequisite for knowing anything is understanding why it is as it is - in other words, grasping its primary cause."2a

" . . . [W]henever there is an end, the whole prior sequence of actions is performed with this end as its purpose."2b


Human Nature.

"Experience concludeth nothing universally. . . But by this it is plain, that they shall conjecture best, that have most experience . . .  "1a



"Everything I have accepted up to now as being absolutely true and assured, I have learned from or through the senses. But I have sometimes found that these senses played me false, and it is prudent never to trust entirely those who have once deceived us."1a


"Even fewer people study man than mathematics."1a

Discourse on Metaphysics.

" . . . [E]verything which is to happen to anyone is already virtually included in his nature or concept, as all the properties are contained in the definition of a circle . . . "1a

" . . . [O]ur soul has the power of representing to itself any form or nature whenever the occasion comes for thinking about it, and I think that this activity of our soul is, so far as it expresses some nature, form or essence, properly the idea of the thing."1b

" . . . [T]he soul already includes the idea which is comprised in any particular thought."1c

Correspondence with Arnauld.

" . . . [T]he individual concept of each person includes once for all everything which can ever happen to him . . . "1d

"In order to call anything possible it is enough that we are able to form a notion of it . . . "1e

" . . . [N]othing happens without a reason . . . "1f

"A body is an aggregation of substances . . . 
Each of these substances contains in its nature the law of the continuous progression of its own workings and all that has happened to it and all that will happen to it."1g

Monadology. "Our reasoning is based upon two great principles: first, that of Contradiction . . . And second, the principle of Sufficient Reason . . . There are also two kinds of Truths: those of Reasoning and those of Fact. The Truths of Reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Those of Fact, however, are contingent, and their opposite is possible."1h

"Today . . . when it has been learned through careful investigations made in plant, insect, and animal life, that the organic bodies of nature are never the product of chaos or putrefaction, but always come from seeds in which there was without doubt some preformation, it has been decided that not only is the organic body already present before conception, but also that a soul, in a word, the animal itself, is also in this body . . . "1i*

Critique of Pure Reason.

" . . . [T]hough all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience."1a

" . . . [B]esides intuition there is no other mode of knowledge, except through concepts . . . "1b

"The possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective reality to all our a priori knowledge."1c

" . . . [I]t is only because we subject the sequence of appearances, and consequently all change, to the law of causality, that experience itself, that is, empirical knowledge of appearances, becomes possible . . . "1d


Utilitarianism and Other Essays.

"The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the last results of metaphysical analysis . . . and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree . . . "1a

The Origin of Species.

" . . . [C]an we doubt . . . that individuals having any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the better chance of surviving and of procreating their kind? . . . This preservation of favourable individual differences and variations, and the destruction of those which are injurious, I have called Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest."1a

"Man selects only for his own good . . . "1b

The Descent of Man.

"No race or body of men has been so completely subjugated by other men, as that certain individuals should be preserved, and thus unconsciously selected, from somehow excelling in utility to their masters."2a

"False facts are highly injurious to the progress of science, for they often endure long . . . "2b


The Principles of Psychology (Volume 1).

"The aim of science is always to reduce complexity to simplicity . . ."1a

"Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its relations. . .
In all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or subject about which all the members of the thought revolve. . .
Relation, then, to our topic of interest is constantly felt in the fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and discord, of furtherance or hindrance of the topic."1b

"Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others . . ."1c

"Geniuses are commonly believed to excel other men in their power of sustained attention."1d

"A native talent for perceiving analogies is reckoned. . . as the leading fact in genius of every order. . . I think I emphasize it enough when I call it one of the ultimate foundation-pillars of the intellectual life, the others being Discrimination, Retentiveness, and Association."1e*

The Principles of Psychology (Volume 2)

"The widest postulate of rationality is that the world is rationally intelligible throughout . . ."2a

The Life of Reason.


"The great glory of mathematics, like that of virtue, is to be useful while remaining free."2f

"Is four really twice two? The answer is not that most people say so, but that, in saying so, I am not misunderstanding myself."2g

"Men know better what is right and wrong than what is ultimately good or evil . . ."2h

"There is tragedy in perfection, because the universe in which perfection arises is itself imperfect."2i

"True science, then, was that which enabled a man to disentangle and attain his natural good; and such a science is also the art of life and the whole of virtue."2j

". . . [S]cience is nothing but developed perception, interpreted intent, commonsense rounded out and minutely articulated."2k

"The darkest spots are in man himself, in his fitful, irrational disposition."2l


The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.

" . . . [T]he scientific value of a formula consists not only in its summing up of given empirical facts but in its power . . . to call forth new facts. The formula states relationships, connections, series which far outdistance direct observation. It becomes one of the most outstanding instruments of what Leibniz called the 'logic of discovery,' the logica inventionis."1a

"The true standard for the evaluation of a physical hypothesis . . . can never be sought in its intuitive reference but only in its efficacy. It is not the simplicity of the image that is decisive, but the unity of the explanation, the subsumption of the totality of natural phenomena under supreme comprehensive rules."1b


Ideas and Opinions.

"The ideals which have lighted my way, and time after time have given me new courage to face life cheerfully, have been Kindness, Beauty, and Truth. . . "1a 

" . . . [T]he scientific method can teach us nothing else beyond how facts are related to, and conditioned by, each other."1b

" . . . [S]cience can only ascertain what is, but not what should be . . . Religion . . . deals only with evaluations of human thought and action . . . [S]cience can only be created by those who are thoroughly imbued with the aspirations toward truth and understanding. This source of feeling, however, springs from the sphere of religion. To this there also belongs the faith in the possibility that the regulations valid for the world of existence are rational, that is, comprehensible to reason. I cannot conceive of a genuine scientist without that profound faith. The situation may be expressed by an image: science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind."1c* 

The Principle of Reason.

"If this is the way it's going to be, may we give up what is worthy of thought in favor of the recklessness of exclusively calculative thinking and its immense achievements? Or are we obliged to find paths upon which thinking is capable of responding to what is worthy of thought instead of, enchanted by calculative thinking, mindlessly passing over what is worthy of thought?"1

The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.

". . . [A]lthough it objectively comprises a great wealth, mathematical knowledge is in itself, in terms of its content, the emptiest knowledge imaginable, and as such is at the same time the least binding for man. . ."5a

"Philosophy does not exist because there are sciences, but vice-versa: there can be sciences only because and only if there is philosophy."5b*

". . . [T]here must be no such circling and thus no circle in philosophy! This is, after all, a universal principle of logic. That is why all scientific philosophy prides itself on getting by without this circle. Yet anyone who has never been seized by dizziness in the presence of a philosophical question has never asked the question in a philosophical way, that is, has never entered the circle in the first place. The only thing that ordinary understanding can see in this circling motion is the movement around the periphery which always returns to its original point of departure on the periphery. Thus it misses the decisive issue here, which is an insight into the centre of the circle as such, an insight made possible in such a circling movement and this alone."5c

Out of the Crisis.

"What is the world's most underdeveloped nation? With the storehouse of skills and knowledge contained in its millions of unemployed, and with the even more appalling underuse, misuse, and abuse of skills and knowledge in the army of employed people in all ranks in all industries, the United States may be today the most underdeveloped nation in the world."1a

"Experience alone, without theory, teaches management nothing about what to do to improve quality and competitive position, nor how to do it. . . Experience will answer a question, and a question comes from theory."1b

"Mathematics, economics, psychology, statistical theory, theory of law, yes, but most studies of accounting, marketing, and finance are skills, not education; most use of computers for paperwork likewise."1c


The Poverty of Historicism.

"How could we arrest scientific and industrial progress? By closing down, or by controlling, laboratories for research, by suppressing or controlling scientific periodicals . . ., by suppressing Universities . . . , by suppressing books, the printing press, writing, and, in the end, speaking."1a

The Computer and the Brain.

" . . . [T]he nervous system has a prima facie digital character."1a*

"The central nervous system occupies a space of the order magnitude of a liter (in the brain), i.e. of 103 cm.3 The number of neurons contained in this system is usually estimated to be of the order of 1010 . . . "1b

"The energy dissipation in the human central nervous system (in the brain) is of the order of 10 watts."1c

" . . . [T]he message-system used in the nervous system . . . is of an essentially statistical character."1d*

"The basic human languages are traditionally transmitted to us in various forms, but their very multiplicity proves that there is nothing absolute and necessary about them. . . [I]t is only reasonable to assume that logics and mathematics are similarly historical, accidental forms of expression."1e

Technology Management and Society.

"Education has moved, from having been an ornament, if not a luxury, to becoming the central economic resource of technological society."1a

"In government, modern technology and the modern economy founded on it have outmoded the national state as a viable unit."1b

"Aware that we are living in the midst of a technological revolution, we are becoming increasingly concerned with its meaning for the individual and its impact on freedom, on society, and on our political institutions. Side by side with messianic promises of utopia to be ushered in by technology, there are the most dire warnings of man's enslavement by technology, his alienation from himself and from society, and the destruction of all human and political values."1c

"The kindergarten stage is over. We're past the time when everybody was terribly impressed by the computer's ability to do two plus two in fractions of a nanosecond."1d


Wholeness and the Implicate Order.

"The new form of insight can perhaps best be called Undivided Wholeness in Flowing Movement. . . In this flow, mind and matter are not separate substances. Rather, they are different aspects of one whole unbroken movement."1a*

"There is the germ of a new notion of order . . . This order is not to be understood solely in terms of a regular arrangement of objects . . . or . . . of events . . . Rather, a total order is contained, in some implicit sense, in each region of space and time."1b*

The Undivided Universe.

"For several centuries, there has been a strong feeling that nonlocal theories are not acceptable in physics. It is well known . . . that Newton felt very uneasy about action-at-a-distance and that Einstein regarded it as 'spooky.'"2a

"The basic idea is to introduce a new concept of order, which we call the implicate order or the enfolded order."2b

"Consider a tree . . . which grows from a seed. . . [L]ife is eternally enfolded in matter and more deeply in the underlying ground of a generalized holomovement as is mind and consciousness."2c


The President's Scientists.

" . . . [W]hile American industry was spending about $76 billion each year on research and development as of 1992, the National Association of Manufacturers estimated that this same industrial sector was spending $118 billion on outside legal services. . . If we continue to pay roughly one and one-half times as much on litigation as we do on the creation of new wealth in American industry -- in other words, research and development -- we are on a trajectory to economic disaster."1*

AAAS Science and Technology Yearbook 1999.

" . . . [I]n my own area of physics and the physical sciences, we have the arrogance to believe that with the tools of mathematics and fewer than 20 natural laws, we can aspire to eventually understand the entire natural universe and its evolution. I have no idea how many laws the average lawyer deals with on a regular basis, but most certainly that number is vastly greater than 20."2

The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA.
" . . . [S]cience seldom proceeds in the straightforward logical manner imagined by outsiders. . . But even more important, I believe, there remains general ignorance about how science is "done.""1a

" . . . [W]e knew what to do: imitate Linus Pauling and beat him at his own game."1b

"All we had to do was to construct a set of molecular models and begin to play -- with luck, the structure would be a helix."1c

" . . . [O]ur reasoning was partially based upon simplicity."1d

" . . . he [Francis Crick] popped out with the idea that the perfect biological principle was the self-replication of the gene -- that is, the ability of the gene to be exactly copied when the chromosome number doubles during cell division."1e

"The idea of the genes' being immortal smelled right . . ."1f

"Even though he [Francis] was a physicist, he knew that important biological objects come in pairs."1g

"If this was DNA, I should create a bombshell by announcing its discovery. The existence of two intertwined chains with identical base sequences could not be a chance matter. Instead it would strongly suggest that one chain in each molecule had at some earlier stage served as the template for the synthesis of the other chain. Under this scheme, gene replication starts with the separation of its two identical chains. . . Thus, the essential trick of gene replication could come from the requirement that each base in the newly synthesized chain always hydrogen-bonds to an identical base."1i

" . . . [W]e had found the secret of life."1h


Shadows of the Mind.

"Understanding is, after all, what science is all about -- and science is a great deal more than mere mindless computation."1a

" . . . the 'tilting' of light cones, i.e. the distortion of causality due to gravity, is not only a subtle phenomenon, but a real phenomenon, and it cannot be explained away by a residual or 'emergent' property that arises when conglomerations of matter get large enough."1b*

" . . . [Einstein's general relativity] theory is confirmed overall to an error of no more than about 10-14."1c

"The expectations of quantum theory were triumphantly vindicated . . ."1d

"Gödel's argument does not argue in favour of there being inaccessible mathematical truths. What it does argue for, on the other hand, is that human insight lies beyond formal argument and beyond computable procedures. Moreover, it argues powerfully for the very existence of the Platonic mathematical world. Mathematical truth is not determined arbitrarily by the rules of some 'man-made' formal system, but has an absolute nature, and lies beyond any such system of specifiable rules."1e*


* Italics in the original.

1 Aristotle. The Metaphysics. Books I-IX. Translation by Hugh Tredennick. G.P. Goold, ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933, 1989. (The Loeb Classical Library.)
Book II, at 87.
Book IV, at 147.
Book VI, at 295.
Book VII, at 311.

2 Aristotle. Physics. Translated by Robin Waterfield, 1996. With an Introduction and Notes by David Bostock, 1996. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Book II: The Study of Nature, at 38-39.
Book II: The Study of Nature, at 51.

1 Thomas Hobbes. Human Nature and De Corpore Politico. Edited with an Introduction by J.C.A. Gaskin, 1994. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1994.
a Part I: Human Nature. Of the Several Kinds of Discursion of the Mind, at 33.

1 René Descartes (1596-1650). Discourse on Method and the Meditations (1637). Translated with an Introduction by F.E. Sutcliffe. F.E. Sutcliffe, 1968. London, UK: Penguin Books Ltd.
a First Meditation: About the Things We May Doubt, at 96.
1 Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). Pensées (1670). Translated with an Introduction by A.J. Krailsheimer. A.J. Krailsheimer, 1966, 1995. London, UK: Penguin Books Ltd.
a Human Nature, Style, Jesuits, etc., at 217.
1 G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716). Discourse on Metaphysics. Correspondence with Arnauld. Monadology. Introduction by Paul Janet. Translated by George Montgomery. Lasalle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1902, 1995.
a Discourse on Metaphysics, XIII, at 20.
b Discourse on Metaphysics, XXVI, at 44.
c Discourse on Metaphysics, XXIX, at 48.
d Correspondence Relating to the Metaphysics, I Leibniz to Count Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, 1/11 Feb., 1686, at 69.
e Correspondence, IX, at 131.
f Correspondence, IX, at 132.
gCorrespondence Relating to the Metaphysics, XXVI Leibniz to Arnauld, Venice, March 23, 1690, at 244. Monadology, at 258.
iThe Monadology, at 268.
1 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason (1781). A revised and expanded translation based on Meiklejohn. Edited by Vasilis Politis. Introduction and Chronology, J.M. Dent, 1993. London, UK: J.M. Dent, Orion Publishing Group. Rutland, VT: Charles E. Turtle Co. Inc.
a The Difference Between Pure and Empirical Knowledge, at 30.
b Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding, at 78.
c System of the Principles of the Pure Understanding, at 152.
d Principle of the Succession in Time According to the Law of Causality, at 173.
1 John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Utilitarianism and Other Essays. Edited with an Introduction by Alan Ryan. Alan Ryan, 1987. London, UK: Penguin Books Ltd., 1987.
a Utilitarianism, at 273.

1 Charles Darwin (1809-1882). The Origin of Species (1859). In Darwin, Philip Appleman (ed.), 2nd ed., New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970, 1979.
a Natural Selection; Or the Survival of the Fittest, at 54.
b Natural Selection; Or the Survival of the Fittest, at 56.

2 Charles Darwin (1809-1882). The Descent of Man (1871). In Darwin, Philip Appleman (ed.), 2nd ed., New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970, 1979.
a On the Manner of Development of Man from Some Lower Form, at 156.
b General Summary and Conclusion, at 196.

1 William James (1842-1910). The Principles of Psychology (Volume 1).  Henry Holt & Co., 1890. Alice H. James, 1918. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1950. (First published by Henry Holt & Co. in 1890.)
a Chapter ix: The Stream of Thought, at 230.
b Ibid., at 259.
c Chapter xi: Attention, at 403-4.
d Ibid., at 433.
e Chapter xiii: Discrimination and Comparison, at 530.

2 William James (1842-1910). The Principles of Psychology (Volume 2).  Henry Holt & Co., 1890. Alice H. James, 1918. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1950. (First published by Henry Holt & Co. in 1890.)
a Chapter xxviii: Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience, at 677.

2 The Life of Reason. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998. [Originally published in 5 v.: The Life of Reason, or, The Phases of Human Progress. New York: C. Scribners' Sons, 1905-6.]

f Chapter 6: Dialectic, at 438.
g Chapter 7: Pre-Rational Morality, at 444.
h Ibid., at 450.
i Chapter 8: Rational Ethics, at 455.
j Ibid., at 458.
k Chapter 10: The Validity of Science, at 484.
Ibid., at 490.

1 Ernst Cassirer. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume 3: The Phenomenology of Knowledge. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Introductory Note by Charles W. Hendel. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957, 1985.
a The Foundations of Scientific Knowledge, at 440.
b The Foundations of Scientific Knowledge, at 463.
1 Albert Einstein (1879-1955). Ideas and Opinions. Based on Mein Weltbild, edited by Carl Seelig, and other sources. New translations and revisions by Sonja Bargmann. New York, NY: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1954.
a The World as I See It., at 8-11. Originally published in Forum and Century, Vol. 84, pp. 193-194, the 13th in the Forum series, "Living Philosophies"; included also in Living Philosophies (pp. 3-7), New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931. 
Science and Religion, Part I, at 41-44. From an address at Princeton Theological Seminary, May 19, 1939; published in Out of My Later Years, New York: Philosophical Library, 1950.
Science and Religion, Part II, at 44-49. From Science, Philosophy and Religion, A Symposium, published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., New York, 1941.
1 Martin Heidegger. The Principle of Reason. Translated by Reginald Lilly. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, at 129. 1 W. Edwards Deming (1900-1993). Out of the Crisis. W. Edwards Deming, 1982, 1986. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1989.
a Ch. 1: Chain Reaction: Quality, Productivity, Lower Costs, Capture the Market, at 6.
b Ch. 2: Principles for Transformation of Western Management, at 19.
c Ch. 3: Diseases and Obstacles, at 130.
1 Karl R. Popper (1902-1994). The Poverty of Historicism. Karl Raimund Popper, 1957, 1960, 1961. London, UK: Routledge, 1994.
a The Institutional Theory of Progress, at 154.
1 John von Neumann (1903-1957). The Computer and the Brain. (Yale University Silliman Lectures.) Preface by Klara von Neumann. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958.
Part 2: The Brain. The Nature of the Nerve Impulse, at 43-44.
b Ibid., at 48.
c Ibid., at 49.
d Part 2: The Brain. Nature of the System of Notations Employed, at 79.
e Ibid., at 81.
1 Peter F. Drucker (b. 1909). Technology Management and Society: Essays. Peter F. Drucker, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970. New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1977.
Ch. 5: Technology and Society in the Twentieth Century, at 82. Reprinted from Technology in Western Civilization, vol. II, edited by Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 1967.
b Ch. 5, at 90.
c Ch. 7: The First Technological Revolution and Its Lessons, at 117. Presidential address to the Society for the History of Technology, December 29, 1965; First published in Technology and Culture, Spring 1966.
d Ch. 10: The Manager and the Moron, at 173. First published in The McKinsey Quarterly, Spring 1967.

1 David Bohm. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. David Bohm, 1980. London, UK: Routledge.
a Fragmentation and Wholeness, at 11.
b Quantum Theory as an Indication of a New Order in Physics. Part B: Implicate and Explicate Order in Physical Law, at 149.

2 David Bohm and Basil J. Hiley. The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory. D. Bohm and B.J. Hiley, 1993. London, UK: Routledge, 1995.
a The Many-Body System, at 57.
b Quantum Theory and the Implicate Order, at 350.
c Quantum Theory and the Implicate Order, at 388.

1 D. Allan Bromley. The President's Scientists: Reminiscences of a White House Science Advisor (Yale University Mrs. Hepsa Ely Silliman Memorial Lectures). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994. Rebuilding the Office of Science and Technology Policy, at 48.

2 D. Allan Bromley. AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook 1999. Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science. Chapter 10: Science and the Law, at (Based on remarks made August 2, 1998 during the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.)

1 James D. Watson. The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA. Foreword by Sir Lawrence Bragg. James D. Watson, 1968. New York, NY: The New American Library, Inc., 1969. (Reprint of a hardcover edition published by Atheneum Publishers, New York, NY.)
a Preface
, at ix.
b Chp. 7, at 37.
Ibid., at 38.
b Ibid., at 38.
Chp. 18, at 84.
b Chp. 21, at 98.
Chp. 23, at 108.
b Chp. 25, at 118.
Chp. 26, at 126.
1 Roger Penrose. Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness. Roger Penrose, 1994. London, UK: Vintage, Random House UK Limited, 1995. First published by Oxford University Press, 1994.
a Preface, at vii.
b What New Physics We Need to Understand the Mind: The Quest for a Non-computational Physics of Mind, at 225.
c What New Physics We Need to Understand the Mind, at 230.
d The reference here is to the 1981 Paris experiment by Alain Aspect et al. What New Physics We Need to Understand the Mind, at 248. 
e What New Physics We Need to Understand the Mind: Implications?, at 418.