The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology:
An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy.
Clarification of the Origin of the Modern Opposition between the
Physicalistic Objectivism and Transcendental Subjectivism
now we must note something of the highest importance that occurred
even as early as Galileo: the surreptitious substitution of
the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the only
real world, the one that is actually given through
perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable -- our
every-day life-world. This substitution was promptly passed on to
his successors, the physicists of all the succeeding centuries. .
he is to be one who thinks for himself [Selbstdenker],
an autonomous philosopher with the will to liberate himself from
all prejudices, he must have the insight that all the things he
takes for granted are prejudices, that all
prejudices are obscurities arising out of a sedimentation of
tradition . . .
A historical, backward reflection . . . is thus actually
the deepest kind of self-reflection aimed at a
self-understanding in terms of what we are truly seeking as
the historical beings we are."1b
The Clarification of the Transcendental Problem and the Related
Function of Psychology
. . . [T]he epochē, . . . the radical
withholding of [judgment on] all that is pregiven, on all
prior validities of what is in the world . . ."1c
pregiven world is the horizon which includes all our goals,
all our ends, whether fleeting or lasting, in a flowing but
constant manner, just as an intentional
horizon-consciousness implicitly "encompasses" [everything] in
. . . [P]ure psychology in itself is
identical with transcendental philosophy as the
science of transcendental subjectivity."1e
is in itself what it is, and is in itself mathematical . .
. everything is decided in advance as pure mathematics and as
nature itself. Such is the dominant hypothesis which has guided
natural science through the centuries. But for the world as a
world which also contains spiritual beings, this
"being-in-advance" is an absurdity . . . For the realm of souls
there is in principle no such ontology, no science corresponding
to the physicalistic-mathematical ideal . . . Phenomenology
frees us from the old objectivistic ideal of the scientific system,
the theoretical form of mathematical natural science, and
frees us accordingly from the idea of an ontology of the soul
which could be analogous to physics."1f
The Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy.
Translated, with an Introduction, by David Carr. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
. . . [M]en live entirely in
a world that has become unintelligible, in which they
ask in vain for the wherefore, the sense, which was once so
doubtless and accepted by the understanding, as well as by the
Part II. From Formal to Transcendental Logic
. . . designates that performance on the part of
intentionality which consists in the giving of
something-itself [die intentionale Leistung
der Selbstgebung]. More precisely, it is the universal
pre-eminent form of "intentionality", of "consciousness of
something", in which there is consciousness of the
intended-to objective affair in the mode itself-seized-upon,
itself-seen -- correlatively, in the mode: being with it
itself in the manner peculiar to consciousness."2b
concept of any intentionality whatever
life-process of consciousness-of something or other -- and the
concept of evidence, the intentionality that is the giving of
something-itself, are essentially correlative."2c
productive doing involves intention and actualization."2d
. . .
[B]efore everything else conceivable,
I am. This "I am" is for me, the subject who
says it, and says it in the right sense, the primitive
intentional basis for my world . . . "I am" is the
primitive intentional basis, not only for "the" world, the one I
consider real, but also for any "ideal world" that I accept . . ."2e
absolute existent is existent in the form, an intentional life
-- which, no matter what else it may be intrinsically conscious of,
is, at the same time, consciousness of itself.
Precisely for that reason . . . it has at all times an
essential ability to reflect on itself, on all
its structures that stand out for it -- an essential ability to
make itself thematic and produce judgments, and evidences,
relating to itself. Its essence includes the possibility of
"self-examination" -- a self-examination that starts
from vague meanings and, by a process of uncovering, goes back to
the original self."2f
whole of phenomenology is nothing more than
scientific self-examination on the part of transcendental
subjectivity, an examination that at first proceeds
straightforwardly and therefore with a certain naïveté of its own,
but later becomes critically intent on its own logos . . ."2g
or the giving of something-itself, as fulfilment,
confirmation, verification, cancellation, falsity, practical
failure, and so forth -- all these are structural forms
belonging a priori to the unity of a life; and the
investigation of this unity, an investigation paying heed to
and clarifying them all, is the immense theme of phenomenology."2h
Husserl. Formal and Transcendental
Logic. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague,
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
The Idea of Phenomenology.
An Introduction to Phenomenology.
Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to
The Paris Lectures.
Italics in the original.
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy.
Translated, with an Introduction, by David Carr. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1970.
(Originally published in German under the title
Die Krisis der
europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie,
edited by Walter Biemel.
Martinus Nijhoff, 1954; second printing 1962.)
Part II: Clarification of the Origin of the Modern Opposition
between the Physicalistic Objectivism and Transcendental
a § 9h. The life-world as the forgotten meaning-fundament of
natural science, at 48-49.
b § 15. Reflection on the method of our historical manner of
investigation, at 72.
c § 18. Descartes's misinterpretation of himself. The
psychologistic falsification of the pure ego attained through the
epochē, at 79.
Part III: The Clarification of the
Transcendental Problem and the Related Function of Psychology.
d § 38. The two possible fundamental ways of making the
life-world thematic . . . , at 144.
e § 72. The relation of transcendental psychology to
transcendental phenomenology as the proper access to pure
self-knowledge. Definitive removal of the objectivistic ideal from
the science of the soul, at 258.
f Ibid., at 264-265.
2 Edmund Husserl.
Formal and Transcendental Logic.
Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague, Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. English Translation of
Formale und transzendentale Logic.
a Introduction, at 5.
Part II. From Formal to Transcendental
b Chapter 1.
§ 59. A universal characterization of
evidence as the giving of something itself, at 157-158.
§ 60. The fundamental laws of
intentionality and the universal function of evidence, at 160
d Chapter 2. Initial questions of
transcendental-logic: problems concerning fundamental concepts, at
e Chapter 6.
§ 60. The transcendental problems of
intersubjectivity and of the intersubjective world, at 237.
f Chapter 7.
§ 104. Transcendental phenomenology as
self-explication on the part of transcendental subjectivity, at
g Ibid. At 273.
§ 107. Delineation of a transcendental
theory of evidence as an effective intentional performance, at